The debate over the possibility of Christian philosophy remains largely intractable because of the modern assumption of a sharp distinction between philosophy and theology. The metaphysical basis of this assumption is an understanding of the world's relationship to God that emphasizes efficient causality and thus introduces a hiatus between the world and God. This contrastive understanding of transcendence parallels insistence on the disciplinary distinction between philosophy and theology. ;St. Gregory Palamas , in his two major works, the Triads and One (...) Hundred and Fifty Chapters, articulates a metaphysics according to which all beings participate in God as their formal principle. This metaphysics maintains God's transcendence in a non-contrastive manner such that it coincides with divine immanence. The possibility to be explored is whether this metaphysics may support an alternative approach to the Christian philosophy debate. ;In Chapter One I argue that the prevailing, anti-philosophical reading of Palamas is misled by his rhetoric and therefore fails to recognize that the target of his criticism is not philosophy in general, but a nascent Byzantine modernism. Chapter Two details the nature of this target as presented by Palamas's main opponent, Barlaam of Calabria. In Chapter Three I examine the metaphysics of participation, which presents the coincidence of transcendence and immanence that is the basis both of Palamas's well-known distinction between God's ousia and activities and of Palamas's radical Dionysian apophaticism. ;In Chapter Four I develop the implication of this metaphysics: the world is radically and thoroughly theophanic or symbolic. The proper comportment of one's soul before such a reality must be contemplative. Therefore, I argue in Chapter Five, the soul must be transformed by the spiritual exercises that constitute philosophy as such a way of life. For Palamas, philosophy is intrinsically constituted by the soul's eros for God. In Chapter Six I argue that once philosophy is understood in this way, the assumed disciplinary distinction between philosophy and theology disappears. Palamas's antimodern stance, then, undermines the modern presuppositions of the Christian philosophy debate and thus may provide an alternative solution. (shrink)

One rarely encounters a work of such metaphysical breadth and ambition. Ford offers no narrowly focused criticism or proposal, but, as the title claims, a transformation of process theism. This is no maverick project, but one based on careful critical analysis and appropriation of the thought of Whitehead and his major interpreters. Ford’s commitment to Whitehead’s thought, although evident, is not uncritical. He is prepared to make modifications, even radical ones, so long as the general tendency of Whitehead’s thought is (...) not abandoned. Thus, Ford seeks to develop Whitehead’s process theism but holds that Whitehead’s mature notion of God is inadequate and that his successors have not successfully addressed this inadequacy. Ford therefore undertakes the current project. His transformation of process theism involves jettisoning Whitehead’s notion of God’s primordial nature and reconceiving God as pure everlasting concrescence, indeed, as future activity. This last notion constitutes Ford’s most radical development. Fully aware that the notion initially appears perplexing, perhaps unintelligible, Ford devotes much attention to developing it and drawing out its implications. He divides his project into three parts: Whitehead’s thought and the unresolved problem in his notion of God; responses to that problem by Whitehead’s interpreters and followers; and Ford’s own transformative project. (shrink)